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Abstract 
The administrative accountability system should not only 
function as punishment, but also guidance for government 
officials. The systematism of accountability procedure 
is surely the foundation, but it is also worth considering 
that how to promote the predictability of the result. China 
should construct the liability immunity system with 
good faith standard to offer government officials both 
legality and reasonableness standard. A liability immunity 
clause could function as guidance and protection in two 
circumstances, namely the circumstance of administrative 
decision making and when the rules are ambiguous.
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INTRODUCTION
The concept of Administrative Accountability was first 
acquainted to Chinese people and drew huge attention 
at 2003 when the highly infectious disease, known as 
SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndromes), broke out 
in China and two senior government officials resigned 
because of the incompetency in dealing with the crisis. 
Since then, the Party and the central government tried to 
establish an administrative accountability system under 
the rule of law by enacting two national regulations, 
namely “Regulation on the Punishment of Civil Servants 
of Administrative Organs”1 and “Interim Provisions on 
the implementation of the Accountability System for 
the leader of the Party and Government”2 (hereafter 
“the Interim Provisions 2009”). Meanwhile, many local 
governments have employed their own regulations on 
administrative accountability like Changsha, Yunnan and 
Beijing. 
Even though administrative accountability has been 
institutionalized on both central and local levels, it only 
serves as belated effort to merely inflict punishment 
on officials after the happening of imputable incidents. 
However accountability system shall not only function 
as the Sword of Damocles over every official’s neck to 
punish incompetency, but also function as the guidance 
and even protection of officials. The so-called “protection” 
does not mean to relax the standard of liability and assist 
officials to escape from their liabilities. However, it means 
that the standard of liability should be clear and officials 
shall not be exposed to uncertain and excessive risk of 
accountability which is the preliminary condition for 
officials to act confidently and audaciously, especially in 
the circumstances of administrative decision making and 
when the rule is ambiguous. Officials should be guided on 
how to mitigate the potential risk of accountability when 
deliver their duties. Meanwhile, China’s Government 
is now under its slimming reform process which entails 
the removal of government review and approvals. An 
accountability system with protective and instructional 
1Regulation on the Punishment of Civil Servants of Administrative 
Organs. (2007). (Promulgated by the State Council directive, April 
22, 2007, effective Jully 1, 2007) St.Council Gaz., No.17. (China)
2Interim Provisions on the implementation of the Accountability 
System for the leader of the Party and Government. (2009). 
(Promulgated by General Office of the CPC Central Committee and 
General Office of the St. Council of the P. R. China, June 30, 2009, 
effective June 30, 2009) St. Council Gaz, No.21. (China)
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functions could also serve as the impetus for the 
slimming reform because one of the main reasons that 
governments are reluctant to give up approval powers 
is that they are afraid of the potential liability risk. It 
does not make any sense that on one hand, we want 
government officials to keep away from the business 
in certain area, but on the other hand, we would like 
officials to assume all the liabilities even when they are 
not imputable to the government. A well-functioned 
accountability system should be able to tell officials 
about the boundary of liability and make them feel safe 
to give up their powers.
Two fundamental requirements shall be met to 
ensure a well-functioned accountability system. 
First is the institutionalization of such system which 
means comprehensive principles and rules shall be set 
beforehand. Secondly, the outcome of such accountability 
procedure, to certain extent, shall be predictable. This 
article will focus on the second point, namely, how to 
promote the predictability.
The topic of administrative accountability system has 
been very popular among Chinese scholars since 2004. To 
research under China National Knowledge Infrastructure3, 
up to 2,746 published theses were presented under the 
topic of administrative accountability in 2013 and more 
than 600 doctoral dissertations focused on this topic. The 
issues of the mentioned theses and dissertations mainly 
focus on the institutionalization of the administrative 
accountability system (Zhou, 2006; Hu, 2006; Chen, 2008; 
Cao, 2011) and some basic theoretical issues (Ren & Fan, 
2013) including implementation body of accountability, 
the classification of liabilities and so on. 
The predictability of accountability outcome is another 
important issue in which many scholars are interested. 
However, almost all the efforts made by scholars to 
promote the predictability can be concluded as to make 
the liability standard clear and definite on the substantive 
level. In other words, duties and liabilities must be set 
clearly and definitely to promote the predictability in the 
case of accountability (Zhou, 2006, p.260, 332; Cao, 2011, 
p.184). Little effort was made to construct a systematic 
instrument in order to promote the predictability 
without addressing the necessity of substantive duty 
clarification. However, in modern society, because status 
and documented rules cannot cover all the administrative 
duties and discretionary power is very common in 
administration, such systematic instrument to promote 
predictability of accountability outcome shall be very 
helpful.
This article would propose to employ liability 
immunity scheme with good faith standard in China’s 
administrative accountability system to promote the 
predictability of the outcome. The first part would 
3 A popular academic research engine in China, also known as 
CNKI.
introduce an existed liability immunity clause which 
recently came into effect in Shanghai Municipality and 
analyze the merits and shortcomings of such clause. The 
second part would run a comprehensive analysis on the 
necessity and feasibility of a well-functioned liability 
immunity scheme in China. The third part would expound 
two scenarios in which liability immunity scheme is 
applicable. The fourth part focuses on the good faith 
standard based on which officials shall seek for liability 
immunity.
1 .   L IABILITY IMMUNITY CLAUSE 
EMPLOYED BY SHANGHAI MUNICIPALITY
In April 2013, Shanghai Municipality published 
“decisions on the promotion of reform and innovation 
(draft)”4 It deemed to be the first official document that 
contained a liability immunity clause, which indicated 
that to promote innovation and allow failure, neither 
the departments nor the officials should be negatively 
remarked in performance appraisal or inflicted with any 
kinds of liabilities in the circumstance that the outcome 
of their decisions did not meet the expectation as long as 
they followed the decision-making procedures and did 
not pursue personal interest. This clause drew attentions 
of the public because it is a milestone to demonstrate a 
new perspective to protect innovation and to promote 
reformation by enacting a liability immunity clause. 
This clause, however, is more of a declaratory effect 
rather than a practical one, because some shortcomings 
compromised the effectiveness and practicality of 
this clause. Firstly, the preliminary conditions of the 
immunity, which are following procedures and no 
personal interest, are standards pro forma. Furthermore, 
lack of substantive standards could lead to rigidness of 
application and over-protection of irresponsible officials. 
Discretionary indolence would happen if the rules only 
require officials to follow rules and not to pursue personal 
interest. Secondly, this immunity clause exempts officials 
from any kinds of liabilities, from civil liability to even 
criminal liability, which is not appropriate. Only Judges 
could tell whether someone should take criminal liability 
after completing all the rules of criminal procedural 
law and the standing committee of Shanghai Municipal 
People’s Congress is NOT duly authorized to exempt 
anyone from this procedure or the liability. Besides, it is 
not necessary to protect officials from criminal liability 
with such clause because the complicated procedures of 
criminal procedural law and the high standard of beyond a 
reasonable doubt in criminal offences could function as a 
much better protection. Therefore, even though this clause 
4 The draft document will not be effective until passed by legislative 
authorities like the standing committee of Shanghai Municipal 
People’s Congress.
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is groundbreaking in the sense to protect officials from 
being exposed to excessive risk and anxiety, it could lead 
to administrative indolence and nonfeasance because of 
the lack of substantive standard.
An amended version of this document has been 
passed by the standing committee of Shanghai Municipal 
People’s Congress and became into effect on July 
19th 2013. In the amended version, a new substantive 
standard of duty of care was introduced to the immunity 
clause. However, even though this duty of care (勤勉尽
职) standard is substantive, it is still an unclear criteria 
and it does not fully deliver the requirement on how 
should an official act in a decision making scenario5. 
There should be a more definite standard with higher 
requirement for officials to follow when they seek for 
liability immunity. 
Therefore, this article proposed to build a liability 
immunity scheme with good faith as the standard which 
consists of formalized and substantive requirements. 
The concept of good faith is a new concept in Chinese 
administrative law but the content of such duty is 
consistent with the existing and well-developed concept, 
duty of loyalty, which is inherent to the core value of 
government officials and has been documented between 
doctrines of “Civil Servant Law of the People’s Republic 
of China (2006)”6. 
2.  THE NECESSITY AND FEASIBILITY 
OF LIABILITY IMMUNITY SCHEME IN 
CHINA
2.1  The Necessity of Liability Immunity
The administrative accountability system in China is still 
on its primary stage where it is used as belated measure to 
punish officials when the expected result is not delivered. 
Such accountability system with result-oriented standards 
has led to two major problems. The first problem is the 
randomness and arbitrary decisions in application of 
accountability. With the vast development of internet 
and social network, “netizens (net citizens)” are able 
to create huge pressure on governments by raising the 
5 The amended clause states that to promote innovation and allow 
failure, neither the departments nor the officials should be negatively 
remarked in performance appraisal or inflicted with related liabilities 
as allowed by law in the circumstance that the outcome of their 
decisions did not meet the expectation as long as they followed the 
decision-making procedures with duty of care and did not pursue 
personal interest. See Art. 11, decisions on the promotion of reform 
and innovation. (Promulgated by the Standing Comm. People’s 
Cong. Shanghai Municipality, June 19, 2013, effective June 20, 
2013), Gazette of the Standing Comm. People’s Gong. Shanghai 
Municipality, No. 6, 2013 (China).
6 Civil Servant Law of the People’s Republic of China. (2005). 
(Promulgated by Standing Committee of The National People’s 
Congress, April 27, 2005, effective January 1, 2006) St. Council Gaz 
No.18, (China).
attention of certain incidents and urge governments to 
initiate accountability procedure (Hu, 2014). However, 
such irregular way to initiate accountability procedure 
is NOT a right way under the rule of law. Furthermore, 
accountability system becomes a way to mitigate 
people’s wrath and when netizens avert their attentions, 
the resigned officials are usually reinstated to other 
positions (Lian, 2012; Hu, 2011; Chen, 2011). Secondly, 
result-oriented accountability system created a negative 
direction that the more works you undertake, the more 
risk of accountability you have to take. In other words, it 
encourages officials to avoid making decisions and choose 
administrative indolence. This arrangement could lead 
to an undesirable situation where incompetent officials 
remain in their positions just because they did not do 
anything while competent officials may be punished for 
the efforts and attempts they made that did not meet the 
expectations. Therefore, it is very crucial and necessary 
in China to alleviate above negative effects caused by the 
existing accountability system and the liability immunity 
scheme can be the answer to solve both of the above 
problems.
Firstly, well-functioned liability immunity scheme 
could put an end to the result-oriented accountability 
system and other factors, besides result, should also be 
considered for accountability. Duties of administrative 
branch have become more complicated with the 
development of society and making discretionary 
decisions is indispensable component of officials’ daily 
work. However, making the right decision does not 
necessarily lead to an expected result, because from the 
situation in which the decision is made, no one could tell 
exactly what would happen in the future and it is unfair 
to punish someone for his or her bad luck. Therefore, it 
should be avoided punishing officials merely based on 
the result or outcome of their decisions, and the situation 
in which the decision is made should be the primary 
element to consider. Furthermore, to implement liability 
immunity scheme could urge the decision-maker in the 
accountability system to consider not only the result, 
but also the comprehensive situation, when whether 
negligence exists or whether liability should be inflicted 
is decided. 
Secondly, liability immunity scheme is a pre-condition 
of an efficient government because it could alleviate 
officials’ fear and anxiety for excessive risk and encourage 
officials to deliver their duties confidently. A strictly 
implemented accountability system without due protection 
of officials would obviously result in discretionary 
indolence because reasonable officials, in such scenario, 
would choose to do nothing instead of making any efforts 
that could get them into trouble. Therefore, a safe harbor 
created by liability immunity scheme could set officials 
free from worries and anxiety about potential liability to a 
large extent.
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2.2  The Feasibility of Liability Immunity in China 
Two feasibility problems with the implementation of 
liability immunity should be addressed before any further 
discussion.
Firstly, many people argued that the immunity clause 
could release officials from their liabilities and could be a 
shield for their irresponsibility (Zhang, 2013). Indeed, lax 
enforcement of accountability rules is the current situation 
in China. However, another situation of strict enforcement 
without due protection of good faith officials is not 
welcomed as well. Moreover, to build a liability immunity 
scheme is consistent with the idea of strict enforcement of 
accountability because it prevents liabilities from being 
inflicted on the wrong person. 
Secondly, liability immunity scheme is supplementary 
to the substantive principle of imputation. Even though 
the principle of imputation in the area of administrative 
accountability has not yet been settled officially by 
the central legislative authority in China, we may still 
summarize two different kinds of principles of imputation 
from existing regulations and documents. The first one 
is subjective fault standard which was adopted by “the 
Interim Provisions 2009”, symbolized with expressions 
like “gross negligence in decision making” or “negligence 
in delivering duties”. The second principle of imputation 
is rule-violation standard which was adopted by, for 
example, “Measures on Administrative Accountability 
of Beijing Municipality”7, symbolized with expressions 
like “in violation of procedural rules” or “in violation 
of existing legal duties”. In fact, either one of the two 
principles has its limitations. Subjective fault standard 
could lead to arbitrariness and randomness because of 
the ambiguous and subjective expressions. Meanwhile, 
even though rule-violation standard is relatively clear and 
definite, it is NOT applicable when there is no rule or the 
rule is ambiguous. Therefore, liability immunity scheme 
can serve as a supplementary arrangement to assist 
principles of imputation and protect officials from undue 
risk.
3.  THE APPLICABILITY OF LIABILITY 
IMMUNITY CLAUSE
3.1  Scenarios in Which Liability Immunity Clause 
Is Applicable
Liability immunity shall not be applicable in every 
scenario of accountability because it is a case-by-case 
scrutiny and decision makers enjoy great discretion in 
deciding whether officials could be exempted under 
the immunity or not. Only in two scenarios the liability 
7 Measures on Administrative Accountability of Beijing Municipality. 
(2011). (Promulgated by Beijing Municipal People’s Government, 
June 16, 2011, effective, October 1, 2011), Beijing Municipal 
people’s Government Gaz. No. 16 (China).
immunity doctrine could be invoked and applied. The 
first one is administrative decision making scenario and 
the second one is scenario where the rules are ambiguous 
or discretion is involved. In other scenarios where 
rules are clear and definite or no discretion is left for 
administration, there is no need for liability immunity 
to promote the predictability of the accountability 
outcome.
The above mentioned liability immunity doctrine 
adopted in “decisions on the promotion of reform and 
innovation” by Shanghai Municipality is a typical 
immunity applied to administrative decision making 
scenario. Decisions made to innovate or to reform would 
withstand great risk because no reform or innovation is 
guaranteed to be successful. Thus officials who make such 
decisions should be exempted from certain liabilities as 
long as they followed explicit procedures and act out of 
good faith. 
Similarly, immunity clause should also be applicable 
to scenario where rules are ambiguous or discretion is 
involved, because the result of official’s reasonable action 
is not necessarily to be successful. Take Openness of 
Government Information Legislation (hereinafter OGI) 
for an example. 
Chinese Central Government enacted “Regulation 
of the People’s Republic of China on the Disclosure of 
Government Information” (passed by the State Council, 
No.492, 2007), many rules of which, however, were 
ambiguous and abstract. For example, exceptions of 
government information that should not be disclosure 
are stipulated in article 14 with only one sentence 
that Administrative organs shall not disclosure any 
information related to state secrets, business secret 
and personal information. There are no further official 
interpretation expounding the above concepts and how 
to implement such article. In practice, thousands of 
rejections of disclosure are issued based merely on this 
article and a huge amount of related disputes arises each 
year on the implementation of this article. The chief 
judge of the administrative court of the People’s Supreme 
Court directly criticized this article as “too abstract, too 
ambiguous and hard to be implemented” in his book 
(Li, 2013, p.210; Wang, 2013). Therefore, without 
appropriate protection like liability immunity scheme, 
reasonable officials would choose to not disclose any 
information that may fall between the ambiguously 
defined exceptions. It is not hard to imagine that a lot 
of information that should have been disclosed is kept 
inside the government because officials are reluctant to 
take the risk. 
Therefore, liability immunity scheme should be 
adopted and applied in such situation to help officials 
make the right decisions rather than “safe” decisions. 
Besides, Among 95 countries that have enacted unified 
OGI law or regulation, 30 countries employed liability 
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immunity of good faith clause like England, Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, India and Thailand8. 
3.2  Scope of Liability Should the Liability 
Immunity Clause Cover
How far liability immunity clause should reach to protect 
officials is a crucial question. As mentioned above, 
criminal liability should not be exempted simply by the 
immunity clause because criminal procedural law and 
standard of beyond reasonable doubts have provided 
appropriate and tested protections. Furthermore, civil 
liabilities or liabilities for damages shall not be covered 
by liability immunity clause in China, because China does 
not allow officials to be sued directly for damages caused 
by act of duty. Therefore, the scope of liability should 
be contained within the administrative branch, namely 
the administrative accountability system. Officials who 
meet the standard of immunity can be exempted from 
administrative punishment or administrative liability. 
Furthermore, performance appraisal is a national test 
for every government official in China and the result 
of such appraisal matters a lot about officials’ career 
because promotion or demotion shall be decided based 
on the result of performance appraisal. Thus, the liability 
immunity clause shall also protect officials who meet the 
good faith standard from being negatively remarked in the 
appraisal.
4.  THE GOOD FAITH STANDARD
4.1  Good Faith Standard in the U.S. Administrative 
Law
In the U.S., people can not only to  file law suits against 
government for tort, they may also directly sue the 
government officials who carried out the alleged tortious 
act. On the other hand, to protect officials from excessive 
risk of law suit, “qualified immunity” is employed to 
exempt officials who act on good faith from any law suits 
filed for damages (Wang, 2005, p.786, 787). Even though 
this qualified immunity is only applicable to liabilities 
for damages and it is very different from the immunity 
scheme this article proposed, it is still valuable experience to 
examine the standard of good faith in the context of the U.S.
Objective reasonableness standard of good faith was 
first developed in the case of Harlow v. Fitzgerald 457 
U.S. 800 (1982). The court stated that when government 
officials performing discretionary functions are entitled 
to qualified immunity if their conduct does not violate 
8 All the information and figures are included in a non-profit database 
co-provided by a Europe-based NGO, Access Info Europe and a 
Canada-based NGO, Center for Law and Democracy. These two 
organizations completed a world-wide rating and ranking process 
of 95 countries which have nationally unified OGI law or regulation 
in 2013. About the process and result of the ranking please see the 
website. Retrieved from http://www.rti-rating.org/ (visited 8 October 
2014).
established statutory right of which reasonable person 
would have known. The objective standard was further 
developed and the test of reasonable officer is introduced 
in Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987). The court 
indicated that the purpose of qualified immunity was to 
give officials with abilities to anticipate liabilities and 
officials should be aware of the fact that they will not be 
held liable as long as their actions are reasonable due to 
legal rules clearly established at time action was taken. 
In other words, the actions are reasonable if reasonable 
officers could have believed such actions are lawful.
It should be noted that the American qualified immunity 
is not immunity from tort liability; rather, it is immunity 
from the law suits. Therefore, judge will decide whether 
qualified immunity is applicable at early stage of a tort case 
before any substantive hearing like discovery9. Besides, 
whether official is liable for tort liability is usually a matter 
of fact and decided by jury. In contrast, the availability 
of qualified immunity is a matter of law and should be 
decided by judge. Therefore, in a later case SAUCIER v. 
KATZ, 533 U.S. 194 (2001),  judge refused to examine the 
reasonableness of the act because if qualified immunity 
had the same objective reasonableness standard as a 
tort case, the reasonableness of the act would be double 
counted which was not necessary. A new two-part test was 
employed in the case of Saucier that (a) whether the alleged 
fact constitutes a violation of constitutional right; (b) if so, 
whether the right is clearly established at the time of the 
alleged misconduct. The two-part test was reversed in the 
case of PEARSON v. CALLAHAN, 555 U.S. 223 (2009), 
because the rigidness of the test would unnecessarily 
prolong some cases. However, the idea of not examining 
the reasonableness of alleged misconduct for qualified 
immunity was affirmed in later cases.
Rules stated in above cases could be summarized 
into three points. Firstly, the need to invoke good faith 
immunity exists only when discretion is involved; 
Secondly, good faith immunity is only available when 
rules are not clearly established; thirdly, objective 
reasonableness test is a direct way to examine good faith, 
but it was abandoned because of redundancy. 
4.2  The Content of Good Faith Standard in the 
Context of Chinese Administrative Law
The requirement of good faith is rooted in government 
officials’ duty of loyalty. Officials’ duty of loyalty consists 
of both legal and moral responsibility which is the ethical 
basis of administrative accountability (Jiang, 2013, p.36). 
Unlike directors’ duty of loyalty to their employers or 
the shareholders, in corporate law, officials’ duty of 
loyalty does NOT belong to their employer which is 
the government. In fact, government officials’ duty of 
loyalty should belong to the constitution and law (Jin & 
Jiang, 2008, pp.11-17). Therefore, the content of good 
9 See MITCHELL v. FORSYTH, 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
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faith standard should be consistent with the requirement 
of duty of loyalty. Officials should be confirmed to be in 
good faith as long as they act out of their respect to the 
constitution and law.
The constitution and law to which officials’ loyalty and 
respect belong, is not limited to the existing statutes or 
doctrines, but also includes legal principles like the principle 
of proportion, principle of reasonableness and principle of 
purposiveness. Therefore the standard of good faith would 
be met if the official fulfils both formality requirements like 
follow the procedural rules and substantive requirements 
like reasonableness and purposiveness.
4.3  Criteria and Test for Good Faith Immunity 
The content of good faith revealed abstract principles that 
officials should follow. However, objective standard is 
still necessary to identify the act in good faith for practical 
reason. The standard of reasonableness employed by the 
supreme court of U.S. before 2001 is a feasible answer to 
the objective standard. Namely, in the situation in which 
the alleged misconduct is made, whether a reasonable 
officer would believe such conduct or decision is lawful 
and appropriate. In fact, such practice to use an imaginary 
reasonable person as a criterion for negligence has been 
very common in China, especially in the area of tort law 
and criminal law (Jiang, 2007, pp.11-17; Zhang, 2011, 
pp.554-55). 
Therefore, to decide whether a conduct or decision is 
made in good faith, a reasonable officer should be assumed 
to have the same position with the actual officer. And if 
this reasonable officer would have believed the conduct or 
decision to be lawful and appropriate in the same situation, 
the actual officer should be confirmed to have acted in good 
faith and thus, enjoy the liability immunity arrangement. 
CONCLUSION
Liability immunity scheme should be introduced into 
administrative accountability system of China. As a safe 
harbor for officials, liability immunity scheme can not only 
provide the impetus for officials to actively and confidently 
deliver their duties, but also promote the predictability 
of accountability outcome. Accountability system could, 
therefore, function as protection and guidance for officials. 
Furthermore, implementation of liability immunity scheme 
is supplementary to the principles of imputation in the 
accountability case and result-oriented accountability 
system would be adjusted by the immunity scheme to 
consider more on the situation when alleged misconduct 
is made. Last but not least, the objective reasonableness 
standard of good faith consists of not only the legality 
or formality criteria, but also substantive criteria like the 
principle of proportion and purposiveness.
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